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Introduction
We develop a series of infinitary epistemic logics to study deductive inference involving intra/inter-personal beliefs/knowledge in social situations. In these situations, people's beliefs may include infinitary components such as common knowledge, common beliefs, and infinite regress of beliefs. To approach such situations, we extend the finitary epistemic logic KD n with n agents to infinitary logics, illustrated as
Each logic GL(L α ) is "small" in that the set of formulae is countable and can be constructive. These logics are formulated in a Hilbert-style, and each is complete with respect to Kripke semantics. This implies that the logics in (1) are connected by the conservative extension relation ⇒, and the series can be used in various manners to evaluate infinitary concepts. Our approach offers a new framework, alternative to the existing literatures on related issues on infinitary epistemic concepts, with applications to evaluations of epistemic axioms and of decision-making processes in game theory.
First, we compare our approach with two literatures on infinitary epistemic concepts: the infinitary logic literature since Karp [19] (for epistemic logics, Kaneko-Nagashima [20] , TanakaOno [33] , Tanaka [32] , Heifetz [12] ), and the fixed-point logic literature (for epistemic logics, Fagin et al. [8] , Meyer-van der Hoek [25] , and for µ-calculus, Enqvist, et al. [7] , Jäger, et al. [16] , and Jäger-Studer [17] ). Both approaches have some merits and demerits; to discuss such merits and demerits, we note that the infinitary epistemic concepts we consider in applications are typically constructed by iterated substitution of the belief operators.
The infinitary logic approach is capable of discussing various infinitary concepts in an explicit and unified manner. However, the languages are very large (at least continuum) in terms of sets of formulae. A large language is not only unnecessary but also sometimes imposes an obstacle for a precise study of targeted infinitary concepts. The fixed-point logic approach has a merit to be specific to targeted infinitary concepts, but has the inconvenience that targeted concepts are indirectly expressed by a fixed-point argument. In contrast to these approaches, ours allows for explicit and unified treatments of targeted concepts and enables us to evaluate, as in (1), how large a given targeted concept requires. The key to our approach is a syntactical concept of germinal forms, upon which we build a series of languages, as explained below.
Our base logic is a finitary KD n with language L 0 (the set of formula); the agents have classical logical abilities and contradiction-free beliefs, described by the belief operators B i (·) for agents 1, ..., n. We extend the finitary language L 0 by adding conjunctions of certain infinite sequences of formulae in L 0 . Specifically, we take a countable number of infinite sequences C ν (p) : ν ≥ 0 = C 0 (p), C 1 (p), ... from L 0 , which we call germinal forms. A typical example is common knowledge. The germinal form for it is given as C ν (p) : ν ≥ 0 = B ν N (p) : ν ≥ 0 ;
The conjunction B ω N (p) := ∧ B ν N (p) : ν ≥ 0 is the common knowledge of p, meaning that p holds, all agents believe p, all agents believe all believe p, and so on. This is not in L 0 , and we extend L 0 to L 1 to have B ω N (A) as a targeted formula. The next layer L 2 is obtained from L 1 by adding the infinite conjunctions ∧ C ν (A) : ν ≥ 0 for A ∈ L 1 , e.g., B ω N (B ω N (A)); roughly speaking, each formula in L 2 includes infinitary conjunctions nested at most twice. Assuming that the set of germinal forms are unchanged, we define L 0 , L 1 , ..., L α , ... up to some ordinal α o ≥ ω := {0, 1, ...}. We show that this extension
The language L α is kept countable for all α ≤ ω. Also, we show that the ordinal depth of each formula in L ω is less than ω 2 .
Infinitary concepts such as common knowledge are typically constructed by iteration of substitutions. Our formulation of a germinal form is rich enough to capture these infinitary concepts. In our approach, however, germinal forms are more generally defined even to allow nonconstructive sequences C ν (p) : ν ≥ 0 . This implies that our theory is quite flexible and could go beyond our current applications.
The proof systems in the series (1) are uniform; they share the same logical axiom schemata and inference rules only with the restriction to each L α . 1 The Kripke semantics is defined also in a uniform manner over α. Each GL(L α ) is proved to be sound and complete with respect to Kripke semantics. It follows from this result that GL(L α+1 ) is a conservative extension of GL(L α ), i.e., for any formula A ∈ L α , A is provable in GL(L α ) if and only if it is provable in GL(L α+1 ). In (1), the double arrow ⇒ describes the conservative extension relation.
To prove Kripke-completeness, we adopt the Q-filter method developed in Tanaka-Ono [33] . Q-filters play the corresponding role to that of maximal consistent sets of formulae in the standard construction of a canonical model. The Q-filter method is crucial, since GL(L α ) deals with both particular infinitary conjunctions and modality. To treat these aspects, our proof relies upon two lemmas, the Rasiowa-Sikorski lemma and Tanaka-Ono lemma; the countability of the language L α is crucial in applications of these lemmas. Although we use various algebraic concepts, our model theory is Kripke semantics, but not algebraic semantics. Our completeness theorem can be modified to systems including additional epistemic axioms, Axioms T (truthfulness -B i (A) ⊃ A), 4 (positive introspection -B i (A) ⊃ B i B i (A)), and/or 5 (negative introspection -¬B i (A) ⊃ B i (¬B i (A))).
We deliberately choose the base logic KD n = GL(L 0 ). In the literature of epistemic logic, all, some, or none of Axioms T, 4, and 5 for B i (·) are adopted depending upon purposes/environments. Axioms 4 and 5 include infinitary aspects, though they are expressed in a finitary way. In our approach, we can study these axioms in terms of explicit definability in GL(L α ) in the series in (1) , that is, we ask whether there is a formula in GL(L α ) such that it is an extension of B i (·) and satisfies each of T, 4, and 5. For T, it is affirmatively answered in all α, for 4, we need α = ω, and for 5, the answer is entirely negative. Also, we consider faithful embedding of the logics added T and/or 4 in GL(L α ). Axiom D is included as a basic axiom in our framework, since it is crucial in proving (20) for playability in Section 5.
We also consider the faithful embedding of the common knowledge logic, denoted CK(L C ), which is the fixed-point extension of KD n , to GL(L α ). As a whole, CK(L C ) is faithfully embedded into GL(L ω ). Logic CK(L C ) is also a fragment of modal µ-calculus (Alberucci [1] ). In this context, we show that a comparison between the rank function given in Alberucci, et al. [2] and our ordinal depth for L ω coincide.
Although CK(L C ) can be regarded as being in the intersection of our approach and modal µ-calculus, these two approaches differ from each other not only in that the former is infinitary while the latter is finitary, but also in that the differences are substantive. We make a small summary of comparisons between our approach and modal µ-calculus in the end of Section 4.3.
Using our framework, we study a decision making process in game theory, called "rationalizability" (cf., Osborne-Rubinstein [27] ). In this theory, an agent "rationalizes" his possible decision by looking for a prediction about his opponent's decision, assuming that the opponent uses the same criterion. This leads to an infinite regress of such rationalization. We show that the full discourse from a consideration of decision-making to the stage of playing a final decision can be given in logic GL(L 2 ). Thus, our framework allows for explication of game theoretic decision making with a clear-cut notion of depths of infinitary reasoning.
The paper format is as follows: Section 2 gives the definition of the sets of formulae. Section 3 formulates the system GL(L α ) and the Kripke semantics, and states the completeness result. In Sections 4 and 5, we give discussions on applications of our framework and the completeness 1 
Below KD
n , a hierarchy of logics of shallow epistemic depths is developed in Kaneko-Suzuki [22] . Each system is a fragment of KD n with a finite epistemic structure, and continues to KD n .
result to the definability problems of various epistemic concepts, and also on an application to the rationalizability concept in game theory. A proof of Kripke-completeness is given in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Small Infinitary Languages L α
We fix an ordinal α o with α o ≥ ω = {0, 1, ...}. We define the class of infinitary languages
For each α, L α is constructed from ∪ β<α L β in an inductive manner, and we will show that L α becomes constant after α = ω. We also evaluate the depths of formulae in L α , and show that the depth of the entire set L ω is ω 2 . In the end of this section, we make brief comparisons with the set of formulae in the literatures of infinitary logics. We stipulate that Greek letters α, β, γ are ordinals up to α o , but Greek ν runs over the natural numbers 0, 1, ...
We adopt the following list of primitive symbols:
propositional variables: p 0 , p 1 , ...; logical connectives: ¬ (not), ⊃ (implies), ∧ (and);
unary belief operators:
The conjunction symbol ∧ is applied to a finite set of formulae and some infinite sequences of formulae. An infinitary conjunction is written as ∧ C ν : ν ≥ 0 and will be specified below. We denote P 0 = {p 0 , p 1 , ...}, and the set of agents (the subscripts for the beliefs operators) by N = {1, ..., n}. We may abbreviate the parentheses (, ) and use different brackets when they cause no confusions.
Let α be an ordinal with α ≤ α o . Let F α be a given set of formulae with F 0 = ∅, which is the source of infinitary conjunctions and is specified below. We define the set L α for α ≥ 0 by a double induction. Specifically, when α = 0, P 0 = {p 0 , p 1 , ...}, and when α > 0, P α = ∪ β<α L β , provided that the set of formulae L β is already defined for all β < α. We define the set L α for each α ≥ 0 by the following three steps:
When α = 0, step Iα2 is vacuous since F 0 = ∅; thus, L 0 is the set of all finitary formulae.
In Iα1, the conjunction symbol ∧ is applied to finite sets of formulae. We write A∧B, A∧B∧C for ∧{A, B} and ∧{A, B, C}, etc., and A ≡ B for (A ⊃ B)∧(B ⊃ A). Iα1 and Iα2 are interactive since formulae generated by Iα2 may be used in Iα1, and vice versa.
The set F α is determined by a given set of germinal forms specified as follows. A sequence C ν : ν ≥ 0 is called a germinal form iff C ν ∈ L 0 for all ν ≥ 0 and a finite number of propositional variables occur in C ν : ν ≥ 0 . Let p 1 , ..., p m be the propositional variables occurring in C ν : ν ≥ 0 . We often denote each C ν in C ν : ν ≥ 0 by C ν (p 1 , ..., p m ), though some of them may not be included in C ν . Let A 1 , ..., A m be formulae in P α = ∪ β<α L β , which are called germs. By substituting A t for each occurrence of p t in C ν (p 1 , ..., p m ) : ν ≥ 0 , we obtain the sequence C ν (A 1 , ..., A m ) : ν ≥ 0 . We say that Φ = C ν (A 1 , ..., A m ) : ν ≥ 0 is generated by a germinal form C ν (p 1 , ..., p m ) : ν ≥ 0 and germs A 1 , ..., A m in P α . This generation is illustrated as follows:
For example, C ν (p) : ν ≥ 0 = B ν N (p) : ν ≥ 0 is the germinal form for common knowledge. We remark that germinal forms do not require (p 1 , ..., p m ) to enter C ν (p 1 , ..., p m ) positively, e.g., C ν (p) : ν ≥ 0 = ¬p, ¬¬p, ... is a germinal form, and a less trivial one will be given later.
Let G be a nonempty countable (possibly finite) set of germinal forms. We define:
F α = {∧Φ : Φ is generated some germinal form in G and germs in P α }.
Since G is at most countable and used uniformly for all α ≤ α 0 , we can see that the sets F α and L α remain countable for each α ≤ α o .
In addition, Iα0 to Iα2 generate the other infinite conjunctions. We call ∧ C ν : ν ≥ 0 ∈ L α an α-infinite conjunction, and C ν : ν ≥ 0 an α-permissible sequence. Sometimes, we simply call
We use the same expression, ∧Φ, for a finite conjunction or an infinite conjunction. We write
A series of languages {L α : α ≤ α o } is determined by a given set of germinal forms G; we may write L α = L α (G) to emphasize the choice of G for L α . Each L α serves a language for an epistemic logic GL(L α ) to be given in Section 3. Thus,
is not only a series of languages but also determines a series of epistemic logics. When G is changing with fixed α, we have another series of languages and logics. Using these series, we discuss the required depth α and germinal forms G for a discourse involving infinitary concepts.
In Section 1, we gave the germinal form C ν (p) : ν ≥ 0 = B ν N (p) : ν ≥ 0 for common knowledge, which is defined by (2). 2 As emphasized in Section 1, this is generated by iterations of substitutions. Here, we give a few more examples; the last one is not based on iterations of substitutions.
Example 2.1 (1) Positive introspection: Let i ∈ N be fixed. We define
The sequence B ν i (p) : ν ≥ 0 is a possible germinal form. Then, we denote
We will see in Section 4 that the formula B ω i (A) is regarded as the infinitary extension of finitary B i (A) in that B ω i (A) enjoys the positive introspection property (Axiom 4) in GL(L ω ).
For both common knowledge and positive introspection, the germinal forms are obtained by substituting for one propositional variable. The next example needs two propositional variables. Game theoretical examples may involve more propositional variables; one example is given in Section 5. (2) Infinite regress: Let n = 2. We prepare two formulae B i (p j ) and B j (p i ) with {i, j} = {1, 2}. Then, the germinal forms Ir
, are generated as follows: for i, j = 1, 2 (i = j),
We write the conjunction
The epistemic infinite regress for agent i from A i and A j is given
Epistemic infinite regress is a subjective concept in that each formula for i occurs in the scope of B i (·), and is an extension of common belief. When
is equivalent to the common belief of A. The epistemic infinitary regress takes subjectivity (and individuality) more seriously than common knowledge and common belief.
(3) More general germinal forms: We do not assume positivity for germinal forms. The example already given is ¬p, ¬¬p, ... , which is generated by iterated substitutions with ¬p. This is inconsistent, but still allowed in our theory. A consistent example is the germinal forms
each of which is obtained by
. Their conjunctions are consistent in our logic containing them in the language.
The above examples are constructed by iteration of substitutions. However, our formulation also allows for infinite conjunctions that cannot be obtained by iterated substitutions. For example, let {k ν : ν ≥ 0} be the sequence of Fibonacci numbers and define
, where i = 1 if ν is even and i = 2 otherwise. This sequence C ν (p) : ν ≥ 0 is a germinal form but cannot be generated by iteration of substitutions. Moreover, germinal forms defined by uncomputable {k ν : ν ≥ 0} are also allowed.
The subformulae of A ∈ L α = L α (G) are defined in the standard manner. Then, L α is subformula-closed. It is proved by the double induction over ordinals α and over Iα0 -Iα2.
The set of formulae L α is increasing up to α = ω, but it becomes constant after α = ω. 
Consider the latter assertion of the theorem. By Iω0-Iω2, P ω ⊆ L ω . Now, we show L ω ⊆ P ω . Take germs A 1 , ..., A m ∈ P ω . These germs belong to L γ for some γ < ω. Hence, ∧ C ν (A 1 , ..., A m ) : ν ≥ 0 belongs to F γ+1 . Thus, any formulae generated by Iω0-Iω2 belong to L β for some β < ω.
is small in the sense that it remains countable. Also, the depths of formulae in L α are relevant to evaluations of infinitary concepts such as common knowledge. We introduce the depth function δ over L ω , which assigns an ordinal number to each formula in L ω . We define δ inductively along the definition of formulae as follows: d0: δ(p) = 0 for all propositional variables p; d1: δ(¬A) = δ(A) + 1, and δ(A ⊃ B) = max(δ(A), δ(B)) + 1;
Step d3 have several cases; Φ may be a finite set of formulae in Iα1 and Φ may be an α-permissible sequence in F α or generated by Iα2. If sup{δ(C) + 1 : C ∈ Φ} is a limit ordinal, then δ(∧Φ) = sup{δ(C) : C ∈ Φ}, and otherwise, δ(∧Φ) = sup{δ(C) : C ∈ Φ} + 1. For any set of formulae Γ, we define δ(Γ) = sup{δ(A) : A ∈ Γ}. Since L 0 consists only of finitary formulae, we have
takes the form ω +k for some finite k, and this k may be arbitrary large; thus, δ(D) < ω +ω = ω2 and δ(L 1 ) = ω2. The following theorem generalizes this observation.
Theorem 2.2. (Depths of formulae) Suppose that G has a germinal form
Proof. (1): As mentioned above, δ(A) < ω for all A ∈ L 0 and δ(L 0 ) = ω. Let 1 ≤ α < ω, and suppose the induction hypothesis that δ(A) < ωα for all A ∈ L α−1 and δ(L α−1 ) = ωα. Then, we prove the assertions for α. First, we show that δ(A) < ω(α + 1) for all A ∈ L α .
Let ∧Φ ∈ F α . Since δ(A) < ωα for all A ∈ Φ by the induction hypothesis, we have δ(∧Φ) ≤ ωα by d3. Thus, δ(A) ≤ ωα for any A ∈ P α ∪F α . Now, consider Iα1. Suppose the other induction hypothesis that for any immediate subformula C of A generated by Iα1, δ(C) ≤ ωα + k for some k < ω. Then, by d1-d3, we have δ(A) ≤ ωα + k for some k < ω.
Consider Iα2. The induction hypothesis is that δ(D) ≤ ωα + k and δ(∧Φ) ≤ ωα + k for some
The case of Iα2.(iii) is similar. Thus, for a formula A generated by Iα2, it still holds that δ(A) ≤ ωα + k for some k < ω. By these two paragraphs and induction, it holds that δ(A) < ω(α
, and by the conclusion of the previous paragraph, we have δ(L α ) = ω(α + 1).
The first part of (2) 
Theorem 2.2 is summarized in Table 2 .1; our infinitary languages L α (1 ≤ α ≤ ω) include infinitary conjunctions but are not much larger than the finitary language L 0 . These extensions are large enough for treatments of infinitary concepts mentioned above. 
Let us compare the above theorem with the infinitary logic approach. Following Kaneko-
, assuming that L β are defined for any β < α, we define
and then L α is defined by Iα0 with F α and ∪ β<α L β and by Iα1-Iα2. We denote the set of formulae for step
This sequence L α increases up to the first uncountable ordinal ω 1 , where we assume α o ≥ ω 1 . TanakaOno [33] considered the smallest set, L T O , that is closed with respect to finitary operations on ¬, ⊃, B i (·) and countable conjunctions:
is the smallest infinitary language in the sense of Karp [19] .
Epistemic Logics GL(L
We formulate a Hilbert-style proof theory and Kripke-semantics for epistemic logic GL(L α ) = GL(L α (G)) with 0 ≤ α ≤ ω and a countable set of germinal forms G. We state the soundnesscompleteness theorem (Theorem 3.1), which will be proved in Section 6. We discuss the hierarchy of GL(L α (G)) with respect to both α and G, and provide four meta-lemmas to be used in Section 4.
Hilbert-style proof theory
The base logic for epistemic logic GL(L α ) is an infinitary classical logic defined by the following four axiom schemata and two inference rules: for all formulae A, B, C, ∧Φ in L α ,
Modus Ponens:
A ⊃ B A B ; and ∧-rule:
We add the following epistemic axiom schemata and inference rule: for any A, C, ∧Φ in L α and i ∈ N,
The above axiomatization is an infinitary version of epistemic logic KD n with the ∧-Barcan axiom (conjunctive analogue of the Barcan axiom ∀x( A(x)) ⊃ (∀xA(x)) in the first order modal logic). Infinitary aspects are included in L4, ∧-rule, and ∧-Barcan, while the other axioms and inference rules do not directly operate on infinitary structures. The definition of L α guarantees the well-definedness of L4, ∧-rule, and ∧-Barcan. Indeed, an instance ∧Φ ⊃ C for L4 is in L α for all C ∈ Φ by Lemma 2.1 and Iα1. The sequence A ⊃ C :
, which is used in (20) in Section 5.
A proof P = X, <; f in GL(L α ) consists of a countable tree X, < and a function f : X → L α with the following requirements:
(o): X, < has no infinite path from its root; (i): for each node x in X, < , f (x) is a formula attached to x;
(ii): for each leaf x in X, < , f (x) is an instance of the axiom schemata; (iii): for each non-leaf x in X, < ,
is an instance of the inference rules, MP, ∧-rule, and Nec.
Infinite branching is possible in (iii) to allow inferences with ∧-rule. Thus, the width of (X, <) can be countably infinite and also the supremum of the depths can be infinite.
When A is attached to the root node of P = X, <; f , we call P a proof of A. We say that
Lemma 3.1 states basic properties of the provability relation in GL(L α ). Since we adopt a particular axiomatization of classical logic, these should be proved. Since the fragment determined by ⊃ and ¬ with L1-L3, MP is a standard formulation of classical proposition logic, a proof of (1) is found in a textbook (e.g., Mendelson [24] ). Since our system additionally includes the connective ∧, (2) is crucial; a proof is given in Kaneko [18] , Lemma 11.1. (3) is the converse of ∧-Barcan, which is proved for any permissible or finite Φ: indeed, since ∧Φ ⊃ A for A ∈ Φ by L4, we have B i (∧Φ) ⊃ B i (A) by Nec and K. Since this holds for all A ∈ Φ, we have, by ∧-rule,
Incidentally, when Φ is a finite set, the ∧-Barcan axiom is unnecessary, i.e., ∧B i (Φ) ⊃ B i (∧Φ) is derived without using ∧-Barcan. 
Remark 3.1.(1):
We can take the standard de Morgan method to define the disjunction formula as ∨Φ := ¬ ∧ {¬A : A ∈ Φ} for a finite set of formulae Φ. For an α-permissible sequence Φ, this could work when we extend Iα2 to include ¬A : A ∈ Φ for any ∧Φ ∈ L α , which is not included in this paper. (2): In GL(L α ), the substitution-rule is stated as follows: for any
where 
Kripke completeness
A Kripke frame K = W ; R 1 , ..., R n is an (n + 1)-tuple of a set of possible worlds and n accessibility relations over W, where W is an arbitrary nonempty set and R i is a serial binary relation over W for each i ∈ N, i.e., for any w ∈ W, (w, u) ∈ R i for some u ∈ W. A truth assignment τ is a function from
|= is uniform over L α for all α ≤ ω; that is, it is defined over L ω and it can be restricted to L α . For any A ∈ L α , we write |= A iff (K, τ, w) |= A for all K, w ∈ W and τ.
We have the following soundness-completeness theorem; the proof of soundness is standard and mentioned below, and completeness will be proved in Section 6. In the theorem, let G be a fixed (at most countable) set of germinal forms.
Theorem 3.1. (Soundness and completeness for GL(L
Soundness (the only-if part) implies the contradiction-freeness of logic GL(L α ), which will be used in the proof of completeness. Also, by soundness, we can see consistency of the conjunctions of both germinal forms in (7) by the following Kripke model; both are true in the middle world.
Soundness is proved as follows: Let P = X, <; f be a proof of A in GL(L α ). We prove by induction on the tree structure of P from its leaves that |= C for each formula C = f (x) attached to a node x in P. Each step is verified in the following lemma. Proof. We see only the truthfulness of ∧-Barcan.
For completeness, a difficulty is to show the existence of a maximal consistent set. For this aim, Karp [19] assumes Axiom of Choice within her axiomatic system. We do not choose this method; instead, we adopt the Q-filter method due to Rasiowa-Sikorski [29] and the multi-modal extension given by Tanaka-Ono [33] . Here, a Q-filter plays the role of a maximal consistent set. A sketch of a proof of our proof will be given in Section 6.1.
The above completeness result holds when we add Axioms T, 4, and 5 (or drop D), either in combination or in isolation, and add the corresponding conditions, reflexivity, transitivity, and euclidean (or drop seriality) on accessibility relation R i (i ∈ N ). Required modifications of the proof will be stated in Remark 6.1. On the contrary, in our framework, we can evaluate these axioms by studying explicit definability of each axiom, which will be undertaken in Section 4.
Conservativity and four meta-lemmas
We have the conservativity result between two logics with orders over α's and G's.
Theorem 3.2. (Conservativity) Let α ≤ β ≤ ω and G, G two sets of germinal forms with
be any serial Kripke model, and w any world in K. By Theorem 3.1, we have (K, τ, w) |= A. Because of subformulaclosedness (Lemma 2.1) and the definition V0-V4 for (K, τ, w) |= , the statement
A by Theorem 3.1.
By Theorem 3.2, our infinitary logics form the hierarchy with the conservative extension relation ⇒, described as in Table 3 .1: each row is a series of logics with the same G, corresponding to (1) , and each column is a series with the same α with G ⊆ G ⊆ G . The weakest logic is GL(L 0 ) = KD n and the strongest is GL(L ω (G)) in the row with the same G. It holds that for each fixed A ∈ L ω (G), we can find the smallest α A < ω and 
In terms of languages, the arrows ⇒ and are strict;
In terms of provability, it is more subtle. Consider positive introspection (Example 2.1. (1)) and let
Conversely, both arrows can be strict. Here, we give only two examples. The strictness holds between GL(L 0 (G)) = KD n and GL(L 1 (G)); we show by Lemma 3.3, given below, that for any
Thus, there is no formula
A proof is given in the working paper version of this paper. 4 Then, there is no formula
However, a general study of the hierarchy in Table 2 .1 is beyond the scope of the current paper.
Here, we give four meta-results; two are known in a finitary KD n (cf., Kaneko-Suzuki [22] ) and the other two are new. First, the depth lemma for GL(L 0 ) = KD n is converted to GL(L α ) by Theorem 3.2. Recall the depth measure δ given in Section 2. 5
Lemma 3.3. (Depth lemma) Let
, which implies ¬A by Lemma 3.3. The second result is an extension of the epistemic disjunction lemma for KD n . The following lemma is stated in GL(L α ), but can be proved in the same manner as in [22] , i.e., by constructing a counter-model based upon Theorem 3.1. Recall Remark 3.1 about disjunction ∨.
Lemma 3.4. (Epistemic Disjunction lemma) Let
The third result enables us to move forward/backward from the beliefs and their contents. This will be used in Section 5.
Proof. The if part is straightforward. We show the contrapositive of the only-if part. Suppose A ⊃ C. By Theorem 3.1, there is a model (K, τ ) such that (K, τ, w) |= A but (K, τ, w) C for some world w ∈ W. Now, we add a new world w * to W so that
is arbitrary for all p ∈ P 0 . We have a new model (K * , τ * ). In this new model, all valuations are preserved from (K, τ ). Since agent i refers only to w at w * , we have
Using this lemma and Theorem 3.1, we can prove that in GL(
Thus, Axioms 4 and T are not provable in our logic. Nevertheless,
This unprovability is shown by the counter-model:
This is a counter-model also for
The next lemma, which is the dual of ∧-rule, will be used in Section 5.
Lemma 3.6. (Infinitary conjunctions) Let
A, ∧ C ν : ν ≥ 0 ∈ L α . In GL(L α ), if A ⊃ ¬C ν for some ν ≥ 0, then A ⊃ ¬ ∧ C ν : ν ≥ 0 .
Proof. Let
A ⊃ ¬C ν for some ν ≥ 0. Let (K, τ ) be any model and w any world in W with (K, τ, w) |= A. By Theorem 3.1,
Since (K, τ ) and w are arbitrary, we have, by Theorem 3.1, A ⊃ ¬ ∧ C ν : ν ≥ 0 .
Application 1: Evaluations of Various Epistemic Concepts
From the viewpoint of epistemic logics, the choices of Axioms T, 4, and 5 are of great importance. Completeness is one criterion but is neutral in the sense that our logics accommodate all these axioms, as stated after Theorem 3.1. Axioms 4 and 5 include infinitary aspects, though they are formulated in a finitary logic. Here, we ask whether each can be explicitly defined in our infinitary logics. The answers differ for T, 4, and 5. Then, we consider the possibility of embedding a logic with such an axiom to GL(L α ). A similar consideration is given to the concept of common knowledge. In the end of Section 4.3, we give a small summary of differences between our approach and modal µ-calculus.
Explicit definabilities of Axioms T, 4, and 5 in GL(L α )
We fix one agent i throughout Sections 4.1 and 4.2. Also, a set of germinal forms G is fixed here. We begin with the following requirements for a target formula
where F i (p) contains only propositional variable p and is the provability relation in GL(L α ). The above requirements are conditions not only for
Another lemma is about the consistency of F i (p). We say that a formula A is consistent in GL(L α ) iff A ⊃ ¬p ∧ p in GL(L α ). A formula A is not consistent if and only if ¬A.
. By the substitutionrule mentioned in Remark 3.1.(2), it holds that ¬F i (p ⊃ p). On the other hand, by FN i , F i (p ⊃ p). This is impossible because GL(L α ) is contradiction-free, as remarked just after Theorem 3.1.
The conditions corresponding to Axioms T, 4, and 5 are as follows: for any A ∈ L α ,
We look for a formula F i (p) satisfying each of these in addition to F0 i to FN i . Whether or not such an F i (p) exists is explicit definability of Axioms T, 4, and/or 5 in GL(L α ).
In the case of Axiom T, we observe that B i (p) ∧ p satisfies F0 i , FE i , and FT i , and it is also the deductively weakest among such formulae; we say that F i (p) is the deductively weakest among the formulae satisfying given conditions iff it satisfies them and for any F i (p) among those formulae, 
Theorem 4.1. (Explicit definability for Axiom T) Let
0 ≤ α ≤ ω. In GL(L α ), B i (p) ∧ p
Proof. We can verify that
B i (p) ∧ p satisfies F0 i , FE i , and FT i in GL(L α ). Let F i (p) satisfy F0 i , FE i ,and FT i . By FE i and FTi , F i (A) ⊃ B i (A) and F i (A) ⊃ A. By ∧-rule, F i (A) ⊃ B i (A) ∧ A,which holds for any A ∈ L α . Thus, B i (p) ∧ p is deductively weakest among F i (p) satisfying F0 i , FE i , and FT i . This theorem holds for every α (0 ≤ α ≤ ω). Also, we can include FK i and FN i as required conditions in Theorem 4.1. Note that G is arbitrary up to this theorem. Now, we go to the evaluation of Axiom 4. We assume that G contains Bω i (p) = ∧ B ν i (p) : ν ≥ 0 with B 0 i (p) = B i (p).
Theorem 4.2. (Explicit definability for Axiom 4) (1): Let
is the deductively weakest among the formulae
. By (1) of this theorem, it is deductively weakest among F i (p) satisfying these requirements.
In contrast to Theorem 4.1, Theorem 4.2 states that Axiom 4 is explicitly definable only in GL(L ω ). It has the implication that
i.e., after ω, further introspection carries no additional information. F4 i with the closure property F0 i directly brings us to infinity.
We showed that both Axiom T and 4 can be explicitly defined in our system, though the depth requirements differs. For Axiom 5, the answer is entirely negative, independent of the choices of α and G.
Theorem 4.3. (Explicit indefinability of Axiom 5) There is no consistent formula
Proof. Suppose that there is some consistent formula (¬F i (p) ). By Lemma 3.5, we have p or ¬F i (p). The former is impossible; and so is the latter because
Thus, Axiom 5 cannot be defined explicitly by a formula in GL(L α ). However, it can still be treated as a logical axiom keeping completeness, as remarked in Section 3.2.
Faithful embedding
The explicit definability results for Axioms T and 4 may imply that an extension GL(L α ) with Axiom T or 4 is faithfully embedded into GL(L α ). For Axiom T, the embedding result is available from L α to L α for any α in terms of language, but for Axiom 4, it can be only from L 0 to L ω . We have no embedding result for Axiom 5. 6 Here, we give a full embedding argument in the case of Axiom 4, and a sketch for the embedding result in the case of Axiom T.
Consider the case of Axiom 4 and recall
) and ψ 4 (B j (A)) = B j (ψ 4 (A)) for j = i. The following theorem states that KD n + 4 i is faithfully embedded to GL(L ω ). The depth of the embedded fragment 
Theorem 4.4. (Faithful embedding of KD4 to GL(L ω )) (1): For any
A ∈ L 0 , KD n + 4 i A in if and only if GL(L ω ) ψ 4 (A).
Proof. (1):
Take an arbitrary Kripke model (K, τ ) for KD n , which is also a model for GL(L ω ). We replace the accessibility relation R i in (K, τ ) by its transitive closure R tr i , and we denote the resulting Kripke model by (K tr , τ ). Then, KD n + 4 i is Kripke complete with respect to those models (K tr , τ ). Then, we prove by induction on the length of A ∈ L 0 that for any world w ∈ W, (K tr , τ, w) |= A if and only if (K, τ, w) |= ψ 4 (A). We consider only case of A = B i (C). Let (K tr , τ, w) |= B i (C). Then, (K tr , τ, v) |= C for any v ∈ R tr i (w). By the induction hypothesis, (K, τ, v) |= ψ 4 (C) for any v ∈ R tr i (w). Since R tr i is the transitive closure of R i , it is equivalent to that (K, τ, v) |= ψ 4 (C) for any v reachable from w by R i . This means (K, τ, w) |= B ν i (ψ 4 (C)) for any ν ≥ 0, i.e., (K, τ, w) |= B ω i (ψ 4 (C)), implying (K, τ, w) |= ψ 4 (B i (C)). Tracing this argument back, we have a proof of the converse. For the cases of other connectives, the argument is similar.
(2):
For a given A ∈ L 0 , we find the maximal iterations, α, of B i (·) inside A; then, by Theorem 3.2 (conservativity), KD n + 4 i A ⇐⇒ GL(L α ) ψ 4 (A). Now, consider the embedding of Axiom T to GL(L α ). Now, we do not need B ν i (p) : ν ≥ 0 ∈ G. In this case, we use the translator ψ T based on
. This translator ψ T is also uniquely defined. Then, we have
This embedding result is essentially the same as the result given in Kaneko [18] , Section 5.
However, the result (13) holds, under a minor additional condition, from GL(L α )+T i to GL(L α ) for all α (0 ≤ α ≤ ω). When α ≥ 1, the definition ψ T over L α needs one requirement on the set of germinal forms G to be closed under the translation ψ T :
This implies that G is countably infinite.
We have the following lemma. Proofs of this lemma and the next theorem are found in the working paper version of this paper. 7
Now, we have the following theorem, where GL(L α )+T i denotes the logic GL(L α ) plus Axiom T for B i (·). Then, the logic GL(L α )+T i is faithfully embedded into GL(L α ) with the translator ψ T . Let 0 ≤ α ≤ ω. 
Theorem 4.5. For any
A ∈ L α , GL(L α )+T i A if and only if GL(L α ) ψ T (A).
Evaluation of common knowledge in GL(L α )
The concept of common knowledge can be formulated in a fixed-point extension of a finitary epistemic logic, often S5-type, (Halpern, et al. [8] , Meyer-van der Hoek [25] ). Here, we consider its KD n variant, and show that this fixed-point logic is embedded to GL(L α ).
The finitary language L 0 is extended by adding the unary operator symbol C N (·) to the basic symbols listed in Section 2.1, and use L C N to denote the extended language. A formula C N (A) means the common knowledge of A among the group of agents N . The common knowledge logic CK(L C N ) is defined to be the extension of KD n with the language L C N by adding the following axiom scheme and an inference rule: for any A,D ∈ L C N , Axiom CKA:
Rule CKI:
A (finite) proof is defined in the same way as in Section 3.1. In this logic, it is shown by repeated use of CKA that C N (A) ⊃ B In contrast, our infinitary logic GL(L α ) allows us to express the concept of common knowledge explicitly, i.e., B ω N (A) = ∧ B ν N (A) : ν ≥ 0 , assuming B ν N (p) : ν ≥ 0 ∈ G. In a similar manner to Section 4.1, we look for a formula F (p) ∈ L α in GL(L α ) having the following properties: for A ∈ L α and D ∈ L α , F0 with the replacement of F i (p) by F (p) and
These require F (p) satisfy the properties corresponding to CKA and CKI in CK(L C N ).
The following theorem states that the common knowledge is explicitly definable in GL(L α ). Since it follows from FCA α and Nec, K for B i (·)'s that F (A) is an infinitary formula, Lemma 4.1 is applied to F (p), the explicit definability holds only for α = ω. 
Theorem 4.6. (Explicit definability of common knowledge). In GL(L ω ), the common knowledge
F (p) = ∧ B ν N (p) : ν ≥ 0
Now, we look at the relation between CK(L C N ) and GL(L α ). The Kripke semantics for CK(L C N ) is the same as that for GL(L α ).
Here, M = ((W ; R 1 , ..., R n ), τ ) is a serial model as in Section 3.2 and the valuation of C N (A) is defined in the same way except the following:
where v is C N -reachable from w iff there is a finite sequence w 0 , ..., w m (m ≥ 0) in W such that w 0 = w, w m = v, and for all k = 0, ..., m − 1, (w k , w k+1 ) ∈ R i for some i ∈ N.
We have the completeness/soundness result for CK(L C N ), which is a variant of the wellknown result (cf., Fagin et al. [8] ); for any A ∈ L C N , A is valid if and only if CK(L C N ) A.
Now we show that CK(L C N ) can be faithfully embedded into GL(L ω ) with the translator ψ C N : L C N → L ω by E0 and E1 0 -E3 0 , and
Then, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.7. (Faithful embedding of CK(L
Proof. (1) can be proved by observing that with the translation ψ C N , the Kripke semantics for CK(L C N ) and for GL(L ω ) are the same. For (2), we take the maximum nested depth α of
A). By part (1) and this, we have (2).
This theorem is similar to Theorem 4.4 with respect to the depths required, that is, the finitary logics are faithfully embedded to GL(L ω ).
It may be relevant to see the rank function given by Alberucci et al. [2] in this context; this concept is defined in modal µ-calculus, but Alberucci [1] shows that CK(L C N ) (based on K-type) can be regarded as a fragment of modal µ-calculus. 
Thus, their rank function for L C N corresponds to our depth function δ for L ω . In the same manner as Theorem 4.7. (2), we can evaluate the depth for each
has the maximum nested depth α < ω of C N (·), it follows from (15) and Theorem 2.
We remark that Theorem 4.7 does not hold for generic common knowledge (Sato [30] , Artemov [4] , Antonakos [3] ). In one version of such logics, the language L J is obtained from L C N by adding J(·). Here, we consider the extension JL(L J ) of CK(L C N ) in which the belief operators B i (·) obey KD n and J(·) obeys S4 axioms (including Nec), and
The expression J(A) is interpreted as meaning that A is "obvious fact" in that it is known to all agents. Interaction Axiom connects J(A) to ∧ i∈N B i (A), but the converse is not guaranteed. In JL(L J ), the operator J(A) is not explicitly defined in terms of B 1 (·), ..., B n (·) and C N (·). Contrary to this, in GL(L ω ), there are multiple formulae satisfying the corresponding properties to the axioms for J(·). The formula F (p) = B ω N (p) enjoys the S4 properties and IA, but for another propositional variable q = p, the formula F (p) = B ω N (p) ∧ B ω N (q) also enjoys all of these properties, but is deductively stronger than F (p).
A more general development in the fixed-point logic literature is given in the study of modal µ-calculus (cf., Enqvist, et al. [7] ). Our approach looks similar in that germinal forms can be based on iterated substitutions. However, the two approaches also have significant difference, as summarized below.
(i) The definition of germinal forms in Section 2 allows non-constructive germinal forms, and even when germinal forms are constructive in terms of iterated substitutions, they may include negative occurrences of propositional variables for substitution. See Example 2.1.(3). In contrast, the positivity assumption that the µ-operator (and ν-operator) is applied only to a formula is crucial. See Enqvist, et al. [7] , Section 3, and Fountaine [9] for related problems.
(ii) The required depth for the language of GL(L α ) is ω(α + 1) (0 ≤ α < ω) and that of GL(L ω ) is ω 2 . On the other hand, Alberrucci et al. [2] showed that their notion of ordinal ranks to evaluate the depths of formulae in modal µ-calculus and it goes up to ω ω . Our germinal forms are sequences in GL(L 0 ) and are assumed to be uniform in generating the series GL(L 0 ), GL(L 1 ), ... In modal µ-calculus, this is regarded as corresponding to A(µx.A(x)), A 2 (µx.A(x)), ..., and the µ-operator is also applied to formulae already including the µ-operator, that is, µy(µx.A(x, y)) as long as the variable condition is satisfied. The difference in the required depths is caused by these facts.
Application 2: Rationalizability in Game Theory
We apply our framework to the study of decision making in game theory, called the theory of rationalizability (cf., Bernheim [5] , Pearce [28] , and Osborne-Rubinstein [27] ). This application has two purposes. First, we show that our framework enables us to formalize each agent's decision-making process in terms of agents' logical inference. Second, it gives a concrete example of a discourse requiring GL(L α ) exactly with α = 2, which differs from the infinitary concepts discussed in Section 4. Also, the theory requires more complex germinal forms involving disjunctions, and we will use the sound/completeness theorem (Theorem 3.1) to prove one step (Lemma 5.4) of the main theorem (Theorem 5.2). We remark that Axiom D is used for (20) in this section.
A 2-person game is given as G = ({1, 2}, S 1 , S 2 , g 1 , g 2 ), where 1 and 2 are agents, S i is a finite nonempty set of available actions, and g i : S 1 × S 2 → R (reals) is the payoff function of agent i = 1, 2. Before the actual play of the game, each agent chooses his action to be played without knowing the other's choice. The focus is on this ex ante decision making.
A crucial component for rationalizability is the best response property: an action s i ∈ S i for agent i is a best response to an action t j ∈ S j for agent j iff g i (s i ; t j ) ≥ g i (s i ; t j ) for all s i ∈ S i , where we often write g i (s 1 , s 2 ) as g i (s i ; s j ). We stipulate that when agent i is focused, the other agent is denoted by j. We say that an action s i ∈ S i for agent i is rationalizable iff s i is a best response to some action s 1 j ∈ S j for j, and s 1 j is a best response to some s 2 i , and s 2 i is a best response to some s 3 j , and so on ad infinitum. 8 The referred action s t+1 i for t is interpreted as a prediction inferred in the interpersonal beliefs of depth t in the mind of agent i. Here, this interpretation is informal; to make it explicit, we go to our formal system. To express the above game theoretical concepts, we add the following atomic propositions as propositional variables to the basic symbols listed in the beginning of Section 2: for i = 1, 2,
The atomic proposition Pr i (s 1 , s 2 : t 1 , t 2 ) intends to mean that "agent i weakly prefers (s 1 , s 2 ) to (t 1 , t 2 )", which is also written as Pr i (s i ; s j : t i ; t j ) with {i, j} = {1, 2}. The expression I i (s i ) means that "s i is a possible final decision for agent i". The finitary language L 0 is now defined by Iα0 and Iα1 with α = 0 based on these additional symbols and the list of primitive symbols in Section 2. In L 0 , the best response property is described as a formula: for s i ∈ S i and t j ∈ S j ,
For rationalizability, we use two types of germinal forms. The first is the germinal forms for epistemic infinite regresses
. The other will be introduced after giving the decision making criterion.
Consider the following criterion for decision making by agent i :
. This is used in his mind, i.e., D R i occurs in the scope B i (·). It states that agent i makes some prediction about the other's decision t j and his decision s i is a best response to the prediction t j . The disjunction ∨ t j ∈S j is specific to the rationalizability theory and to capture the idea of rationalization.
The criterion D R i is self-insufficient in that it lacks the description of how agent j infers t j in agent i's mind; that is, agent i needs to have a certain criterion for it. We assume that agent i has the same (symmetric) criterion, D R j , to predict a possible t j for the imaginary agent j in agent i's mind. This is formally expressed as B i B j (D R j ). However, this formula includes B i (I i (t i )) in the innermost D R j , and by the parallel argument to the above,
is required. Unless we force this argument to stop at some finite level, this leads to an infinite regress:
The conjunction of this sequence is exactly the infinite regress formula
. We regard the infinite regress Ir i [D R ] as a system of equations with unknowns I 1 (s 1 ) and I 2 (s 2 ); agent i may find some formulae so that they could be regarded as solutions for
, we introduce the germinal forms to express the rationalizability property.
First we choose subsets of propositional variables {p i (t 1 ; t 2 ) : (t 1 , t 2 ) ∈ S 1 × S 2 } for i = 1, 2 from {p 0 , p 1 , ...}, where p i (t i ; t j )'s are all distinct. We define two sets of sequences { rat ν i (s i ) : ν ≥ 0 : s i ∈ S i }, i = 1, 2, interactively as follows: for i = 1, 2,
Hence, G R consists of |S 1 | + |S 2 | germinal forms, and each rat ν i (s i ) : ν ≥ 0 contains 2×|S 1 × S 2 | propositional variables for substitution. set of these germinal forms by G R . We adopt the set of germinal forms G IR+R := G IR ∪ G R . The series of languages {L α : α ≥ 0} is defined based on G IR+R . Let s i ∈ S i and i = 1, 2. For each ν ≥ 0, let Rat ν i (s i ) be the formula obtained from rat ν i (s i ) by substituting Bst i (t i ; t j ) for all occurrences of each p i (t i ; t j ) in rat ν i (s i ), which is still in L 0 . The rationalizability formula is given as Rat i (s i ) := ∧ Rat ν i (s i ) : ν ≥ 0 , which is in L 1 . Again, we note that Rat i (s i ) occurs in the scope of B i (·).
The formula Rat i (s i ) is intended to be a solution of the inference process (17), i.e., Ir i [D R ]. However, the directions of predictions are opposite to (17) ; in (17) , predictions go to deeper (t i )), and so on to ν = 0. In the latter, we require s i to satisfy this backward argument for all ν ≥ 0. For this reason, it holds that
with some additional axiom determines I i (s i ) to be equivalent to Rat i (s i ). The one direction is given by the following theorem, which will be proved later in this section.
Theorem 5.1. (Necessity) Let s i ∈ S i , s j ∈ S j and {i, j} = {1, 2}. Then,
In (1), Ir i [D R ] implies that if agent i believes that s i is a final decision, then he believes the rationalizability property for s i . In (2), the conclusions for both agents in (1) form an infinite regress. The epistemic logic GL(L 1 ) is sufficient for (1), but GL(L 2 ) is required for (2) 
is provable, then each Rat i (s i ) would be a candidate for I i (s i ). This argument is formulated as follows:
. 9 In fact, we need the infinite regress
in order to have the converse of the conclusions of Theorem 5.1. We have the following theorem, which will be proved below. 
The first is the converse of Theorem 5.1. (2) . Combining this and Theorem 5.1. (2), we obtain the second assertion, the full characterization of I 1 (s 1 ) and I 2 (s 2 ), which is done in GL(L α ) with α = 2. The infinitary logic GL(L 2 ) is required and is sufficient to have these results. Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 study the logical inferences required for decision making and possible final decisions. These are not about an actual play of a recommended action. The next stage for agent i is the play of such an action. For this, the agent needs the detailed information about the payoff functions g 1 and g 2 of the game G = ({1, 2}, S 1 , S 2 , g 1 , g 2 ). The payoff function g i (i = 1, 2) is formulated in terms of atomic propositions as follows: (19) which is denoted by Γ i . We assume the infinite regress of these preferences, i.e.,
We denote the set of rationalizable actions by R i in the sense of the non-formalized game theory. Incidentally, Bernheim [5] proved that R i = ∅ for i = 1, 2 in any finite game G.
Returning to our logical framework, it holds that
which will be proved in the end of this section. Thus, under the infinite regress of preferences
, agent i can decide whether a given action s i is rationalizable or not. To relate this to a description of agent i's decision, we combine (20) 
Note that the conclusions of (20) and Theorem 5.3 can be formulated in the form of infinite regress including predictions.
The above discourse starts with the decision/prediction criterion and goes to the consideration of a play of the game. The main engine is logical inferences by agent i and the imaginary agents in his mind. The discourse of decision making is done within the infinitary logic GL(L 2 ). In the game theory literature, decision making and existence of a resulting outcome have been discussed a lot, but these are not explicitly connected by agents' logical inferences. The above discourse is the very first attempt in this respect.
From the viewpoint of logic, the above discourse is based upon complex germinal forms, G IR and G R , though they are still obtained by iterations of substitution. The germinal forms G IR for infinite epistemic regress are conceptually not specific to the theory of rationalizability, but the germinal forms G R i are specific to the theory of rationalizability. In fact, infinite epistemic regress can be captured in terms of a fixed-point logic, similar to the common knowledge logic. However, so far, we do not know whether the rationalizability property is captured in terms of a fixed-point logic, though we conjecture an affirmative answer.
We remark that when "some prediction" in D R i is replaced by "all predictions", the theory becomes the decision making following the line of Nash's [26] theory; specifically,
. Then, we can develop the theory in a parallel manner, with the use of only germinal forms of infinite regress, to the discourse in this section, but this theory depends more upon the payoff structure and is more complex as a whole (see within the framework of a fixed-point logic).
Finally, we prove the above theorems and (20) . All steps, except for Lemma 5.4, are done in proof-theoretic ways in GL(L 1 ) and GL(L 2 ). Lemma 5.4 is proved using the Kripke semantics. The proof of (20) is partially semantic since Lemma 3.6 is used. 
Proof. We prove (1), (3), and (4). 
) by Nec and K, and since
Proof. We show this by induction on ν.
Since
, we have the assertion for ν = 0. Suppose the assertion for ν. Then,
Hence, we have the assertion for ν + 1. 
] by Lemma 5.1. (3), we have the assertion.
To prove Theorem 5.2, we will show that The first step for D R i (Rat) for i = 1, 2 is the following lemma.
Proof. We prove the assertion by induction over ν ≥ 0.
This implies This is applied to Nat ν j (s j ) for all i = 1, 2, s i ∈ S i , and ν ≥ 0. Also, when A contains only atomic preference propositions for agent i, the premise in (21) can be ∧Γ i .
We prove, by induction over ν, that for i = 1, 2, s i ∈ S i , and ν ≥ 0,
For
, we obtain (22) and (23) for ν = 0 by applying Nec and K. Suppose that (22) and (23) hold for ν. By (21),
, and hence, by (21) again, 0 ∧(Γ 1 ∪ Γ 2 ) ⊃ (Nat ν j (t j )∧Bst i (s i ; t j )) for some t j ∈ S j . For this t j , it holds that ∧Γ i ⊃Bst i (s i ; t j ) and
by (22) for ν. Combining these, we have
(s i ), which, by Nec and K, implies (23) for ν + 1. Now, take any s i ∈ S i . Then, let s i be rationalizable action. Then, 0 ∧(
Let s i be a non-rationalizable action. Then, 0 ∧(
. These imply (20) .
Proof of the Completeness of GL(L α ) by Q-filters
We adopt the Q-filter method to prove completeness of GL(L α ). First, we give a sketch of the proof, a summary of the concepts to be used, and then go to the main body of the proof.
Sketch of the proof
As usual, we show that if a formula A ∈ L α is not provable, we find a Kripke model so that A is not true in some world. It is standard in the literature to construct maximal consistent sets as those possible worlds via the Henkin method (cf. Hughes and Cresswell [15] ). This may appear to be applicable to our logics because the set of formulae L α (0 ≤ α ≤ ω) is kept countable. But this does not work in our case for two reasons. Since GL(L α ) allows infinite conjunctions, the Henkin method to extend a consistent set does not fit our purpose; the infinitary approach from Karp [19] avoids this difficulty by requiring Axiom of Choice in the axiomatic system (cf. Heifeitz [12] in the epistemic logic context). Instead, we adopt the Q-filter method, due to Rasiowa-Sikorski [29] for algebraic semantics and Tanaka-Ono [33] for Kripke semantics. A Q-filter is a strengthened version of a prime filter to deal with infinitary conjunctions. This method has been developed as an alternative to prove completeness for a first-order logic as well as for infinitary modal logics (cf., Tanaka [32] ). We note that the countability of the language L α is crucial in applications of these lemmas.
The Q-filter method relies upon various concepts in Boolean algebra, though we deal with Kripke semantics rather than algebraic semantics. Utilizing the Q-filter method, we construct a counter-model. This is not the canonical model; instead, we start with the Lindenbaum algebra L α / ≡, where ≡ is the equivalence relation of provability in GL(L α ). Then, a Q-filter is a subset of L α / ≡ and is a possible world for the counter-model. A Q-filter is required to satisfy certain closure properties in addition to the prime filter condition. These closure properties are guaranteed by the formula construction steps, Iα2.(i) and (ii), for the definition of L α . Once the set of possible worlds is defined, accessibility relations R i , i ∈ N are defined in a similar manner as in the standard proof based on maximal consistent sets.
In Section 6.2, we provide a small summary of Q-filters in a Boolean algebra. In Section 6.3, we define the Lindenbaum algebra based on GL(L α ), and prepare for applications of the Rasiowa-Sikorski and Tanaka 
Boolean algebra and Q-filters
We give basic definitions and relevant properties of a Boolean algebra (cf., Halmos [10] and Mendelson [23] ). Consider a Boolean algebra B = (B, , , −, 0, 1). We define a ≤ b iff a b = b. Then ≤ is a lattice ordering on B (i.e., a b and a b are the greatest lower bound and least upper bound of a, b with respect to ≤). We say that a nonempty subset F of B is a filter iff F1(upward closed): a ≤ b and a ∈ F =⇒ b ∈ F ; and F2( -closed): a, b ∈ F =⇒ a b ∈ F. Also, we say that a filter F is prime iff P1(Non-triviality): F = B; and P2( -property): a b ∈ F =⇒ a ∈ F or b ∈ F. We have the following fact on a prime filter F :
In the following, we write a
For any subset S of B, the greatest lower bound of S in (B, , , −, 0, 1) is denoted by S, and the least upper bound of S is denoted by S. Note that S and S may not exist, but if either exists, it is unique. Let Q = (Q 1 , Q 2 ) be a pair of countable sets of nonempty subsets of B so that (( , )-closed): Q 1 and Q 2 exist for all Q 1 ∈ Q 1 and Q 2 ∈ Q 2 .
We say that a prime filter F is a Q-filter iff
Q2: for any Q 2 ∈ Q 2 , Q 2 ∈ F =⇒ a ∈ Q 2 for some a ∈ F . These correspond to the conditions F2 and P2. The following is Rasiowa-Sikorski lemma (see also Tanaka For a given Q = (Q 1 , Q 2 ), we denote the set of all Q-filters of B by F Q (B). The nonemptiness of F Q (B) follows from Lemma 6.1 if 0 = 1. The set F Q (B) will be adopted for the set of all possible worlds in our construction of a Kripke model.
Since the logic GL(L α ) has belief operators, Rasiowa-Sikorski lemma is not enough: We extend it, which is Tanaka-Ono lemma. We say that B = (B, , , −, 0, 1, 1 , . .., n ) is a multimodal algebra iff ma1: (B, , , −, 0, 1) is a Boolean algebra; ma2: for i ∈ N, i is a unary operator on B satisfying the property that i 1 = 1 and i (a b) = i a i b for all a, b ∈ B. We define
Let B be a multi-modal algebra, and Q = (Q 1 , Q 2 ) a fixed pair of countable sets of nonempty subsets of B satisfying ( , )-closedness. The following three conditions are crucial for the Tanaka-Ono Lemma: for all i ∈ N , 
Lindenbaum algebra
Recall In the following, we call L in Lemma 6.3 the Lindenbaum algebra. We prove the following lemma, which guarantees we can use Lemmas 6.1 and 6.2 in the proof of completeness. Now, consider a non-propositional formula A in L β . Suppose that A is generated by Iβ1. Here, the induction hypothesis (abbreviated as IH), is simply that the assertion holds for any proper subformulae of A. The case ∧ is applied to an infinitary conjunctive formula. (∧) : Let ∧Φ be a finite conjunctive formula generated by Iβ1, or an infinite conjunctive formula given from a germinal form. In the latter case, any A ∈ Φ belongs to ∪ γ<β L γ . In either case, IH is that the assertion holds for any A ∈ Φ. In these cases, we have the following proof. such as common knowledge; and it allows for the direct evaluation of depths of such infinitary concepts. Similar to the fixed-point approach, we can control infinitary expressions by imposing specific germinal forms. Moreover, we have shown that our completeness result holds for each layer, and our logics in different layers are connected by the conservative extension relation.
We provided two applications. The first is about explicit definabilities of epistemic axioms T, 4, and 5. Specifically, we showed that Axiom T can be captured in GL(L α ) for any α (0 ≤ α ≤ ω), Axiom 4 can be done in GL(L ω ), since it needs infinite iterations of the belief operator. Axiom 5 is not explicitly definable for any α (0 ≤ α ≤ ω). These results differentiate the three axioms. The second is for game theory: we considered an agent's decision-making in a game, based on the idea of rationalizability. We gave a full epistemic characterization, which was done within GL(L 2 ), a shallow part in the series in (1), and, based on this characterization, we obtained the playability result for an agent in a game.
Our approach gives rise to new open problems. As already stated, a full study of Table 3. 1 is an open problem of great importance. As seen in Section 4.3, we showed that some known fixed-point logics such as common knowledge logic can be faithfully embedded into our system (Theorem 4.7). In recent years, the fixed-point approach has been extensively developed in modal µ-calculus, and a natural question is whether such embedding results can be extended to (some specific fragments of) those logics, and what relationship exists between our system and modal µ-calculus. A full answer to this question remains open, though we gave a summary of differences in our approach and modal µ-calculus in the end of Section 4.3.
There are open problems related to explicit definability and embedding. We studied explicit definability and embedding for each of the three epistemic axioms and common knowledge. However, a general criterion for an infinitary (and/or finitary) concept to be explicitly definable in some GL(L α ) remains open. 10 A related problem is to have a general understanding of when a fixed-point logic can be embedded into our system.
Our framework adopts the Hilbert-style proof theory. One alternative would be to formulate it in the Gentzen style sequence calculus. In particular, if cut-elimination is available, then one can discuss the sizes of proofs. For this purpose, there are two possibilities from the literature. One is to adopt Kaneko-Nagashima [21] 's formulation in the context of an infinitary logic, which is close to the original Gentzen formulation. Cut-elimination is available, while ∧-Barcan prevents it from implying the full subformula property. Another is in the modal µ-calculus, for which Brünnler-Studer [6] provided a different Gentzen style formulation, focusing on some shallow fragments for cut-elimination. A full study of these systems remains open.
